There is currently no general philosophical account of constitutional patriotism available.
It has also often been unclear which particular overall purpose a theory of constitutional patriotism is supposed to serve. Is constitutional patriotism simply a functional equivalent of nationalism; is it about stabilizing expectations of political behaviour and ultimately an account of how to generate social integration and political stability? Put differently: Is constitutional patriotism essentially a variety of Rawlsian political liberalism, which is supposed to ensure the stability of societies divided by deep disagreements, without disrespect to a range of non-liberal comprehensive worldviews? Might it even be described as a form of "statist nationalism," whose purpose is to ensure loyalty to the state, but which is structurally no different from cultural nationalism (and potentially equally illiberal), as critics have claimed?
10 Or does constitutional patriotism actually surpass Rawls's political JOURNAL OF POLITICAL THEORY 483-503 (2007) . 8 Critical theorists would of course not accept his distinction. 9 Oldenquist, supra note 6, at 68. This article outlines in Section 1 the elements that any theory of constitutional patriotism needs to contain. In particular, every such theory, first of all, should clarify its overall purpose. What is the question to which constitutional patriotism is supposed to be the answer? We cannot take for granted that we need such theories in the first place.
In addition, every theory should provide an account of what I call the object of attachment, the mode of attachment and the reasons for attachment. Related to the first in particular, there is a requirement of specificity-that is to say, the theory must explain why those committed to universal principles should attach themselves to one polity rather than another. Finally, a theory ought to answer questions about the precise motivational (and, perhaps, emotional) consequences of constitutional patriotism. Are we in the end talking about a kind of civilized form of allegiance, reasonable loyalty, about some sort of tempered pride, or about other kinds of emotions altogether? What political mentality and set of collective dispositions would characterize a people subscribing to constitutional patriotism?
11 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS (MIT Press, 1998) at 500.
Before answering these questions, a fundamental distinction needs to be drawn so as to avoid some of the most common misunderstandings of constitutional patriotism.
Following Rainer Forst, I argue that constitutional patriotism is a normatively dependent concept-it is not by itself a theory of justice or of legitimacy. 12 It is possible to think of a purely positivist notion of constitutional patriotism, that is, broadly speaking, any lasting attachment on the part of citizens to enduring political arrangements (irrespective of any orientation toward human rights and democracy). However, a normatively substantive, or moral, reading of constitutional patriotism needs a background theory of what renders political arrangements legitimate. Therefore, in order to answer the questions posed above, we must sketch a moral background theory of fairness that renders our vision of constitutional patriotism normatively substantive. The background theory offered here is centered on the idea of sharing political space on fair terms. Note, however, that one could formulate other background theories that argue for different accounts of fairness or justice.
As stated at the outset, a general theory of constitutional patriotism should be clear about its own limits. Constitutional patriotism by itself is not some kind of civic panacea in cases of collective political breakdown but, more importantly, I will argueperhaps disappointingly for some-a concept that must rely to some extent on existing political units. It is not a freestanding theory of political boundary formation and, therefore, does not answer questions about political self-determination that rival theories, such as liberal nationalism, might well be in a position to answer (although those answers might turn out to be unsatisfactory from a normative and practical standpoint). solidarity in the sense of high spending on welfare, as some of its proponents have claimed. 13 Rather, social solidarity in this specific sense will crucially depend on how strong an interpretation of the underlying idea of fairness can take hold in a particular political culture.
These two seemingly defeatist conceptual concessions might prompt questions, about the point of constitutional patriotism. As I argue in section 2, constitutional patriotism makes it possible to avoid the "sources of moral danger" (Alasdair MacIntyre) often associated with both liberal nationalism and traditional forms of patriotism-and this is its distinctive virtue. 14 Serving both as a source of civic trust (and therefore stability) and as a source of civic empowerment, it is inherently Janus-faced. Citizens are asked, then, to attach themselves to, and maintain, a system of rules for lawmaking that tracks their interests and that they would have no good reason to reject. It is on such a basis that ordinary laws and ordinary politics, as well as reasonable disagreements about particular interpretations of the constitution, should be acceptable even to those who find themselves in a minority. Ordinary law will then have at least an indirect justification-it is produced by way of directly justified legal procedures defined in the constitution, and is therefore presumed to be legitimate.
Michelman argues persuasively that citizens have to be attached, in the first place, to the very idea of a constitution-or, if one wishes to avoid overburdening the notion of "constitution," the idea of committing oneself to mutual justification in a well- (2001) . 18 Id., at 261. ordered society, with fair terms of cooperation and fair terms of limiting power.
However, citizens are not asked to agree on or accept a particular constitution in all its specificity. In fact, it is perfectly reasonable for citizens to disagree even about constitutional essentials (and not just their application). Such disagreement will be likely, since a general justification on the one hand and application on the other cannot properly be separated. Citizens will not be able to foresee the outcomes of particular applications, and may in many instances have good reasons to disagree about how to translate constitutional essentials into actual legal and political institutions. In fact, norms and their realization in particular institutions are hard to separate at all. One need not go as far as Michelman and claim that "constitutional law is institutional stuff from the word go,"
19 but it should come as no surprise that constitutions will serve as the site of intense, yet reasonable moral and political contestation, not least in light of the core idea of fairness that is, as yet, imperfectly realized in any given, really existing constitution.
Constitutions, then, necessarily produce a form of contained disagreement, or limited diversity. What contains and limits is, again, the attachment to the very idea that citizens conceiving each other as free and equal should find fair terms of political cooperation that they can justify to each other. It is to this critical and admittedly highly abstract idea that constitutional patriots must adhere through thick and thin. And yet it is not at all irrelevant that citizens have such an "abstract and critical democraticconstitutional orientation to the systems of cooperation in which they find themselves";
as James Tully has put it, they at least share "a mode of problematisation of their political identity." 20 Political situations look very recognizably different where such a mode is absent, where fair cooperation or even just somehow trying to share a political space have ceased to be common goals -whereas, as for instance Heinz Klug has shown with regard to post-apartheid South Africa, democratic constitutionalism can bring about a certain degree of civility even in deeply divided societies.
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It is on this still rather abstract level that constitutional patriotism enters the picture. In (inevitable) cases of reasonable disagreement, constitutional patriotism will provide minorities with a genuinely moral motivation to maintain the constitutional regime as a whole. After all, they have reason to maintain a system which is supposed to embody the ideal of mutual justification, even if-in all likelihood-no individual citizen at any one point will judge the embodiment of this idea in all its specificity congruent with his or her conception of fairness. Citizens who find themselves in a minority might not always see that the system as a whole is in their interest when they feel that they have lost out on what for them is an important issue. In such cases, constitutional patriotism exerts additional moral pressure to uphold the system; it furnishes minorities with good, normative reasons to give "losers' consent."
At the same time, constitutional patriotism also provides minorities with a language to contest majority decisions, when they feel they have been treated unjustly.
In other words, constitutional patriots in a minority will have a way of appealing to the majority's attachment to principles of fairness-in which case the majority cannot simply dismiss the minority as those whose self-interests have lost out with particular decisions. For instance, minorities can try to tell stories about ever widening circles of inclusion, appealing to a common patriotic care to remain faithful to constitutional essentials and render their realization "ever more perfect." In that sense, constitutional patriotism is also part of an account of the sources of the long-term stability of 21 HEINZ KLUG, CONSTITUTING DEMOCRACY: LAW, GLOBALISM, AND SOUTH AFRICA'S POLITICAL constitutional regimes-it provides a common language, or a mode of political problematization or contestation within a shared normative framework.
From specific debates and even disagreements about the constitution eventually emerges what some have termed a "constitutional identity," but what I would prefer to call a "constitutional culture." 22 "Identity," in my view, suggests too static a picture, and tends to narrow the focus to an actual written document; whereas "culture" points to the fact that we ought to include shared symbols, rites and rituals of membership, and venerated institutions, such as constitutional courts, that are associated with and, at least partially, express constitutional essentials. 23 But it might also be something more abstract-such as certain practices of conducting debate in civilized fashion-that could come to characterize a constitutional culture; such situated practices would then also demand support from constitutional patriots.
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Constitutional culture is not as expansive a term as "political culture"; at the same time it might turn out to be more, not less particular, than "political culture," themselves; they are read and reread in light of particular historical experiences, new information, mutual learning across borders, and so on. 25 These experiences cannot be neatly separated according to those contained in a single "majority culture" and those of a number of "minority cultures"; and it cannot be the goal of constitutional patriotism completely to "decouple" majority culture and political culture and to chase the illusionary aim of total state neutrality, as some of Habermas's initial formulations suggested. 26 Rather, the point is that a more narrow conversation about constitutional culture remains open to a diverse range of experiences, which need to be translated into a language that relates to constitutional essentials -in order to interpret and develop them, but ultimately also re-affirm their normative content.
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The term culture, as opposed to "identity," also underlines that we are not dealing with something homogeneous or necessarily harmonious, and that the idea is precisely not the notion that the constitution is primarily the expression of an underlying national core identity. 28 Constitutional cultures are at least partly defined by the very nature of ongoing disagreements and deep-seated conflicts within a general constitutional settlement; and yet, characteristic forms of conflict and difference still refer to the same thing; and, as political theorists from Machiavelli to Albert Hirschman have argued, contained conflict can in fact also have an integrating and stabilizing effect. 29 A constitutional culture, then, will be characterized by certain styles of political claim-making and contestation, as well as ways of (at least temporarily) agreeing to disagree. In other words, conflict perceived as legitimate can be as important as consensus for a particular constitutional culture. More specifically, citizens attach themselves to the norms and values at the heart of the constitution, that is, the constitutional essentials, and, in particular, to the fair and democratic procedures that can be presumed to produce legitimate law. Habermas has stressed time and again that complex modern societies cannot be sustained by a "substantive consensus on values but only by a consensus on the procedure for the an illusion, or an illegitimate appropriation to think "the universal" can somehow be accessed directly or claimed in some incontestable manner-instead of being earned in conversation and negotiated and contested.
Even in its specificity, however, constitutional patriotism remains primarily an attachment to norms or principles. What makes constitutional patriotism different from other forms of attachment is that it is not a group of people or a culture tout court that claims allegiance. Constitutional patriotism is meant to be political through and through:
people and "culture" become relevant only to the extent that they have an impact on politics, or, more specifically, the ground rules for the collectively authorized exercise of coercion.
Now it is possible to redescribe the object of attachment as, ultimately, a way of life or form of life, or even as a kind of community. In fact, there has been considerable debate over where to draw the line between universalist morality-which, prima facie, must be more or less the same at the heart of every constitution-and what, in Habermas has proposed a division of practical reason into what is practically expedient, ethically appropriate and morally right. The first is based on instrumental, strategic considerations; the second is concerned with questions of personal identity and the good life; while the third -the moral --aims at finding rules and decisions which are rationally acceptable to all affected by the rules. According to Habermas, it is in the realm of the ethical that collectives reach an understanding of who they would like to be, and which of their traditions they should continue or modify in the light of moral discourses. Unlike in the realm of morality, here one cannot presume "right" answers.
But one can hope for authentic and coherent self-descriptions under which collectives can properly recognize themselves.
Even in the eyes of those sympathetic to Habermas's concerns, he has assumed far too many political and legal questions to be answerable purely in the moral realm.
Some critics have gone a step further and blurred the line between moral and ethical altogether. As Thomas McCarthy has put it, "because we only ever have access to the abstract system of basic rights as "refracted" through particular constitutional traditions, in itself an argument for giving up on the distinction altogether. In particular, the distinction might serve to motivate citizens to distance themselves, to the extent possible, from their ethical commitments in order to view specific disagreements in a more general light. Even within inevitably complex, moral-cum-ethical debates about particular laws and policies, participants should remain willing to shift to higher levels of abstractions, wherever possible, in order to reach agreements.
3. Modes of Attachment
Having clarified the object and the specificity of constitutional patriotism, I will move on to the other elements that are needed for a general account, as set out at the beginning. In particular, I will focus on the mode of attachment. In moral-psychological terms, it might best be defined as reflective, critical, or even ambivalent sometimes. Constitutional essentials, and constitutional culture more widely, are viewed in a critical light and are subject to periodic evaluation and re-evaluation in light of what citizens take to be universal norms.
Constitutional patriotism is supposed to be reflexive. That is, it occasionally must be revised and refined in light of the further development and refinement of the 35 Id. at 139.
principles at the heart of our constitutional regime. In that sense, it could also be called, drawing on a very Habermasian concept, a "collective learning process." 36 It presumes an open future and the willingness of citizens to adjust the reasons, the object, and the mode of their attachment in light of new experiences; consequently, they see their constitutional culture as always open and incomplete-a project in which those in the past have been engaged and in which their descendants will invest. 37 We know that, practically speaking, polities cannot live in permanent states of self-questioning and ambiguity. The (highly stylized) point is about a basic attitude toward politics that calls at least sometimes for intense critical attention. We cannot tell in advance what these moments will be like, what might trigger them, or whether "collective learning" might not go wrong under certain conditions and lead to a "collective un-learning." But this point is hardly trivial, as conceptions of constitutional patriotism centered on a static "constitutional identity," or forms of liberal nationalism that tend to rely on a reified core ethnic identity, would not necessarily frame the picture this way.
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As far as reasons for attachment are concerned, I have already indicated that citizens who seek to treat each other as free and equal in a common social space have reasons to adopt the principles of constitutional democracy. They also have reasons to sustain a struggle for the best realization of these principles through reasonable disagreement. Clearly, there are more or less strict versions of this argument, depending 36 As Habermas put it: '…the interpretation of constitutional history as a learning process is predicated on the nontrivial assumption that later generations will start with the same standards as did the founders…Al participants must be able to recognize the project as the same throughout history and judge it from the same perspective'. Does any of this imply that attachment has to be entirely rational? Certainly within constitutional patriotism as a form of attachment cognitive elements will predominate. But the symbolic contents of a constitutional culture, its narratives and projections into the future, will also evoke particular emotions. In fact, it will in all likelihood evoke a complex set of emotions-as opposed to simple pride, for instance. 40 Shame, righteous indignation, and even anger and guilt might play more of a role than other emotions or passions commonly included in accounts of belonging. 41 These emotions, however, will necessarily depend on "cognitive antecedents"; it is a mistake not to recognize that cognition and emotion are intimately related-emotions (or at least those of concern in political life) are, after all, based on beliefs.
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The moral life of constitutional patriots, then, is potentially rather complexwhich is not to say that it is somehow uniquely complex. At the same time, it would be and civic inclusion. What participants in that struggle might feel attached to is not only the principles of justice and inclusion but also other participants, with whom they share a history. In all likelihood, they also feel attached to the actual outcome of the struggle-to particular political institutions devoted to justice, for example, or to a more diffuse change in political mentalities. However, just as the distinction can be blurred, these two kinds of loyalty may also come into conflict. People we care about may behave, or even develop, in ways that violate principles we care about. The main point is that it is not the case that "the gears of loyalty simply do not engage the Constitution." 48 Principles can command loyalty as much as people can.
A better objection than saying that there is no "alternative in the wings" would be to claim that if we only care about principles, we might as well leave a country whose constitution is developing in such ways that the principles in question are being violated.
The issue is the extent to which loyalty depends on any kind of shared history, as
Fletcher claims. The answer, taking off from the discussion about constitutional culture, would seem to me to be something like this: even universal principles are embodied in particular institutions and practices-and we can become attached to these institutions without automatically turning into particularists. These particular institutions and practices also have meaning for us by virtue of our attachment-and our involvement in the shared history of supporting, criticizing and revising them. 49 As Joseph Raz has put it, "meaning comes through a common history, and through work. They make the objects of one's attachment unique." 50 So it is certainly possible-conceptually, and empirically-to be attached to universalist principles and feel loyalty to a particular constitutional culture. Why should all this be important? A reasonable one-word answer would be McCarthyism. Any discussion of loyalty and the constitution is haunted by the spectre of political witch-hunts of those suspected of lacking political loyalty or "civic reliability."
Proponents of cultural nationalism especially have felt tempted to oppose uncomplicated belonging, by virtue of culture, to membership based on achievement or oath. It is often claimed that the latter does not allow for a genuine sense of "being at home," as belonging will be dependent on potentially changing standards of political behavior.
Paradoxically, then, the unchosen (birth or culture, for example) makes for political freedom and enables tolerance (think of an idealized version of Britain, tolerant of political eccentricities)-whereas the possibility of political choice makes for exclusion (think of the US and McCarthyism).
I am not sure that this argument can be easily trumped. It does presume culturally homogeneous entities (otherwise, fragmentation and the possibility of exclusion reenter). And it does presume that the political expression of these cultural entities will not place limits on cultural tolerance. But this in itself is not an argument for exclusively political identities as an alternative. In fact, we might have to admit that there is no guarantee that constitutional cultures will not turn out to be intolerant. But by the same token, it is hardly inevitable that political forms of belonging will cash out as the need for loyalty oaths. In any case, the more heterogeneous societies become, the less they have an option to stick with an expectation of cultural conformity and not give citizens a choice.
There is also a further, theoretical response to anxieties about McCarthyismalthough it provides no guarantee either. After all, constitutional patriotism itself-at least in the way I have presented it-refers us back to the core idea of citizens 50 Ibid., 20.
recognizing each other as free and equal. It is hard to see that constitutional cultures built around this idea could ever become so perverted as to encourage systematic intolerance-but it is not impossible, of course. What needs to be stressed, though, is that the self-critical and the reflective is built into the very notion of constitutional cultures that constitutional patriotism is supposed to sustain-as a form of postconventional, post-traditionalist, post-nationalist belonging, in the strong moral reading suggested here. Such a constitutional patriotism finds the normative resources for contestation within itself-it has recourse to the very grounds of the constitutional essentials that are being violated; or, put differently, it is reflexive.
The limits of constitutional patriotism
As indicated at the outset, it is important to stress what constitutional patriotism does not provide: in particular, it is not in itself a theory by which to determine political boundaries. In this regard, one might say, it shares a weakness of liberal thought more generally: that of by and large taking for granted existing bounded political space. Certainly no demand for cultural self-preservation by means of political autonomy could be deduced from the theory. It is true that constitutional patriotism makes a claim for the de-centering and mutual opening of existing constitutional cultures. In that sense-very broadly speaking-it is more likely to come down on the side of political arrangements that integrate, rather than those that separate. But this is a relatively weak guideline. It is conceivable in theory that a national minority, faced with unbearable oppression, would set up its own state, institute a constitutional regime, and make a point of critically reworking its own traditions. There is nothing necessarily contradictory about a group of politically self- This also means that constitutional patriotism dispenses with the distinction between "good civic" and "bad ethnic" nationalism that sociologists have rightly called "conceptually ambiguous, empirically misleading, and normatively problematic." 56 Consequently, we also should not call constitutional patriotism a fancy version of civic nationalism: it is a transformative conception of living-together different from civic nationalism; and it does suggest a different moral psychology than nationalism of any sort, whether ethnic or civic.
Constitutional Patriotism as Policy
Finally, I turn to more concrete questions, particularly to address the suspicions that Could it be that, in the contexts where something like constitutional patriotism matters, it is impossible to produce it, and where it already exists, it does not matter much whether it fades into liberal nationalism or something like it? In this section, I
tackle what constitutional patriotism might imply practically-especially for the "integration" of minorities and of societies at large.
But first a broader point: there is only so much that can be said at a very general normative level about "integration." There is a core set of principles that liberal democracies must not violate; but beyond those, much will depend on the particular background histories and aspirations of the countries and minority groups in question, cultural belief systems, family and clan structures, and so forth. Claiming, for instance, that "Muslim communities" across Europe have to be "integrated" in a certain way assumes that the fact they are Muslims is the most important thing there is to know-as if the differences were not greater between a second-generation Turkish non-citizen member of the middle class in Germany, whose father was a guest worker, and a second-generation French citizen whose father fought the Algerian rebels alongside the French army in the war of Algerian independence.
Moreover, the very language of "integration" thus conceived suggests an image of human beings being moved, or pushed, around in large-scale, possibly highminded, schemes of social engineering-an image that further seduces its exponents to think that "boundaries" or "thresholds" can clearly be specified, so that humans are recognizable as above or below the threshold, or as inside or outside the national culture -the concept that liberal nationalists cherish above all.
What can be said about integration generally is this: its core principles are based on fairness-the very idea that animates the strong moral reading of constitutional patriotism proposed in this article. What this means, above all, is that there is a prima facie case for civic inclusion for those who have lived and worked within a polity that conceives itself as subscribing to constitutional patriotism. Thus, for example, an interminable exclusion of guest workers, or "illegal aliens"-when it is clear that the human beings in these categories contribute to a bounded scheme of social cooperation-cannot be permissible under the reading advocated here.
It is permissible, however, to require that those to be included meet certain criteria-criteria that can be more clearly and more justly specified in a framework of constitutional patriotism than under the rubric of liberal nationalism. It is, in my view, wrong to see constitutional patriotism and its expression in more concrete policies as inevitably contaminated with culture and ethnicity, and therefore as exclusionary in the way that, for instance, Dora Kostakopoulou has suggested. 57 It is perfectly true that citizenship tests alone will not ensure anything, and that integration, when understood as a "collective mental process," cannot be "ordered by law. In the same way, the ability to speak the majority language of a country is much more likely to contribute to integration than mastering a specific civic vocabulary would be. The main point, however, is that not all requirements or expectations beyond a simple procedure of civic registration send a signal of hostility, and not everything that appears to affirm "identity" is primarily designed to reinforce exclusion. Not all political or even historical knowledge that might be seen as important for citizenship is automatically exclusionary on an ethnic basis. Events, historical figures, and broader principles themselves might well become part of a larger narrative of inclusion: it all depends how it is done.
To be sure, constitutional patriotism is not meant to be a return to traditional, and rightly discredited, ideals of assimilationism as cultural conformity that have often been associated with civic nationalism (which in turn, as often noted, is not in any way itself an indicator of actual cultural openness, let alone socioeconomic porousness).
Constitutional patriotic integration is not simply code for absorption, which itself might be code for assimilation, which might in turn figure as code for "acculturation"-in other words, the same chain of unwarranted assumptions and expectations that liberal nationalism tends to encourage. Rather, following Rogers Brubaker, we might imagine a shift from "transitive" to "intransitive" understandings of assimilation, of integration not as something done to "them" but, rather, as something accomplished in common through mutual deliberative engagement (for the most part under state auspices), but above all, done "with them"-in such a way that a reconstituted "we" emerges. 59 Integration thus understood is not normatively opposed 59 Think of the de facto creation of the Conseil Français du Culte Musulman by the French state, and the series of Islamkonferenzen initiated by the German Interior Ministry. One might object that these are rather desperate attempts to address challenges of cultural diversity with the tools of old-style European corporatism. However, the reaction from within the French and German Muslim communities have been far too favourable simply to dismiss these efforts as crude state attempts at forcing society to be legible. For subtle discussions of French Republicanism's multiple, contested, to the value of difference or diversity, but is meant practically to prevent marginalization and "ghettoization" and, therefore, contrasts, above all, with "benign neglect." Third, are tests and rituals of membership applied across the board to applicants?
Inconsistencies would indicate liberal nationalism, or a form of republicanism that remains, more or less secretly, imbued with a particular national culture. 63 Take as an example the initial attempt by some German states to apply certain tests only to applicants for citizenship from so-called Muslim countries.
Fourth, is public justification of immigration regimes and membership rights and duties oriented toward political values and constitutional essentials in particular? Again, it will be difficult to draw hard and fast distinctions-but there clearly is a difference between these regimes and those that justify immigration through kinship, or economic benefits, or historical bonds and legacies.
Fifth, what is the legal approach to the de facto multiculturalism of a given country? In particular, is it consistent across ethnic, religious and cultural communities?
For instance, is there a libertarian free speech regime, or one that could be called "dignitarian" because, as in German and other European law, the dignity of collectives and their capacity to be insulted is explicitly recognized? 64 If so, is what appears as the
